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Abstract The text deals with a policy instrument developed
by the European Union, namely the so called Mobility Part-
nerships. Framed within the BGlobal Approach to Migration
and Mobility^ of the EU, this rather new concept (1) is pro-
moting new ways of legal migration, (2) is combating irregu-
lar migration and human trafficking, and (3) strengthening the
nexus between migration and development. In the end, a
BWin-Win-Win^ situation should be established for all the
parties being involved: Migrants, originand destination coun-
tries. What characterizes the partnerships in the first place is
flexibility: on the one hand the optional involvement by EU-
member states and on the other the wide and flexible range of
contents. Signatories are the EU Commission, participating
member states and in each declaration one third state. For
the moment, partnerships with following countries do exist:
Cape Verde, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan,Moroc-
co and Tunisia. The text gives a general introduction and
analysis on the EU Mobility Partnerships plus the specific
case of the Mobility Partnership with Moldova. Three essen-
tial research questions are raised to be answered: (1) First, how
and with what purpose are different aspects (migration, secu-
rity, development, labour market and economy) linked within
the Mobility Partnerships? (2) Second, which interests and
actors underlie the partnerships? (3) And third, what percep-
tion of Bdevelopment^ is accompanied by the new policy in-
strument? These questions are answered through the method-
ological approach of the hermeneutic data analysis and the
theory of the critical border- and migrationregime.
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Introduction
One glimpse at any European newspaper edited lately makes
the reader gain the impression that crises and problems keep
getting bigger and even more. A lot of negative developments
emerging simultaneously started to show their effects on
Europe: The Economic Crisis leading to the maybe worst labor
market expectations for a long time and not just recently, but
even closer to the core of Europe now, the number of people
seeking for asylum has been escalating enormously. The tragic
images of boat people trying to reach Europe’s coasts match the
scenes along some European internal borders, the overexten-
sion of European governments disclose their cluelessness
concerning the future. The latest idea coming up in onemember
state after the other is demarcating themselves through fences,
which does without question make us think back in European
history when borderlines were clearly drawn like that.
During the last decade the external dimension of the Eu-
ropean Union’s migration policy has shifted between an
increasing isolation and a selective opening of the labor
markets for specific groups of profession and qualification.
Especially Bexternal shocks^ like tragic events as described
above often led to reacting through new political initiatives
and strategies [7: 284].
One strategy, which was implemented as a consequence
first in 2008 was the EU (European Union) concept of Mo-
bility Partnership. Its core idea is not any more part of the
credo of closing any European border, but is contracting
partnerships with third countries to improve the controlling
of migration and at the same time offering third country
citizens to enter legally on purpose of working in the EU.
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Hereby, labor shortage shall be compensated, the pressure
of immigrants reduced and the countries of origin support-
ed. In 2008 two pilot-partnerships started with Cape Verde
and Moldova. Meanwhile five more partnerships were
amended with the following countries: Armenia, Georgia,
Azerbaijan, Morocco and Tunisia.
As suggested earlier, different fields of policy are affected
by the concept of Mobility Partnerships, e.g., migration poli-
cy, external security, labor market policy and development
policy. Given this overview it can be described as a multidi-
mensional concept. Presuming that the EU is not going into
total isolation after the most recent events and is going to stick
to the idea of the Mobility Partnerships: is there a chance that
this multidimensional concept might be part of a solution to
the eclectic and multilayered problems Europe is going to face
in the upcoming years?
In the following this question is going to be dealt with,
through a general introduction and analysis on the EU Mobil-
ity Partnerships plus the specific case of the Mobility Partner-
ship with Moldova. As it was one of the first partnerships
started, first reports and assessments on the experiences and
effects are already available.
The concept of mobility partnerships
The interweaving of the two discourses of migration and de-
velopment, the so-called migration- and development-nexus,
is a long discussed topic. Castles [3], for example, deals with
the questionwhether migration or development has come first.
Generally scientists agree that both phenomena are part of one
process: The higher the Bdevelopment^ (in a socio-economical
sense) the more are the options of mobility, which stimulate
migration in turn. It is exactly this understanding that did not
quite reach the public and politics. What’s dominating is the so
called Broot-causes^-approach which indicates migration as a
simple consequence of causes in origin countries, which again
suggests to reduce migration by fighting its roots, e.g.,
diminishing poverty [3: 1].
Influenced by this positive connoted nexus the EU de-
signed a new concept as regards migration policy as well:
mobility partnerships. According to the proponents of this
strategy the advantage and goal lie in a Btriple-win^-situation
for migrants, partner countries and EU member states [2: 5].
The specific design of each partnership might differenti-
ate. From EU’s part it applies to each country whether it
wants to participate in mobility partnerships. Regarding
the content, the focus areas and emphasis might vary as well
[2: 16]. The past relation between the EU and the third
country play an important role when designing the
country’s specific mobility partnership because the agree-
ment should operate in addition to existing approaches,
agreements and cooperation [2: 24]. Therefore the
European Commission emphasizes the individuality of
each agreement combining the partner’s specific needs
and the EU’s goals. Among the possible commitments from
third countries are readmission (of their own citizens and
transit migrants), an initiative to prevent irregular migration
by improving border control, combating cheat and forgery,
preventing trafficking in human beings and supporting of
productive occupation and humane working conditions. To
meet these and commitments alike the EU and potential
participating member states hold out the prospect of finan-
cial and technical support [5: 4–5].
The legal character of mobility partnerships is multilay-
ered, as the EU and others carry out some responsibilities by
the member states. The compatibility of the relation built be-
tween the member states and third countries to the existing
legal and political frame of the EU remains the uppermost
priority though [5: 3].
The mobility partnerships are legally registered in forms of
political declarations between the participants. Therefore the
agreements are legally not binding [4: 4].
Intentionally the partnerships shall not be rigid, but flexi-
ble, Bliving documents^. The agreement is for example always
open for new participants. Thus the flexibility is a call upon
the participating actors as well to adjust the partnership as
concerns changes and new requirements [2: 16, 22].
The idea drawn in published communications on mobility
partnerships and circular migration do not just show that mo-
bility partnerships influence different policy areas but disclose
as well that policy areas are interwoven with each other.
Hence it clearly follows the idea of a global and holistic ap-
proach. Roughly spoken there can be elaborated three central
links between different policy fields, which are presented in
the following.
Development policy and security policy
The European Commission emphasizes regularly the impor-
tance of supporting ways of legal migration to counteract
Billegal^migration. According to this understanding, Billegal^
migration reduces automatically in favor of legal migration
because of possibilities to migrate regularly more easily. This
idea of the capability of intervening and controlling migration
processes corresponds to the prevalent image in EU politics on
what is effective migration policy. Whereas this link is not
approved empirically, Angenendt [1] points out that
[…]individuals who are willing to participate in legal
immigration programs could be prevented in engaging
in dangerous attempts at illegal immigration because
they would have the reasonable hope of actually
reaching their goal, possibly with some delay but with
a much lower risk.[1: 3]
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Measures which are suggested by the Commission in the
communication on mobility partnerships are on the one hand
the support of readmission agreements and on the other hand
the improvement of possibilities of legal migration for third
country citizens – which are maybe connected with the
greatest success for both parties in the negotiations. Different
forms of a favored treatment in the case of legal migration can
be agreed on. Firstly, the Commission introduces the possibil-
ities of employment rates, which could be surveyed due to the
needs of European labor markets to match between offer and
demand. Secondly, improvements for the admission of mi-
grants of specific categories (e.g., professions) are recom-
mended. Part of this might be as well the admission for studies
and education [5: 5–6].
Schwiertz [9] perceives in the opening of new legal migra-
tion paths a legitimating by the EU to enlarge and intensify its
control [9: 153]. The connection between Blegal^and
Billegal^migration which is established by the Commission,
is to be understood as a link between aspects of development
policy (mostly according to an economical understanding of
profits in the sense of money but as well gain of knowledge,
which can be achieved by citizens of partner countries during
temporary migration) and goals of security and migration pol-
icy for EU member states, which are hoping for an improve-
ment in the control of migration.
Development policy and labor market policy
Further interwoven with the topic of Visa is the commitment of
EU member states to short-term visa, a part of the dogma of
circular migration, which is pursued by the EU and shall pre-
vent from long-term emigration of highly qualified people,
hence from brain drain. Improvements are planned on two
levels: Firstly, on the operational level where consular cooper-
ation shall be revised, especially to be capable to pursue the
strived flexibility regarding the validity and duration of visa
which should serve as reward for those migrants who are acting
compliant to the rules. Secondly, on the systematic level to
ensure specific professions easier access in general [5: 7–8].
Through the promotion of short term migration but as well
the inclusion of study and educational migration and the sup-
port in re-migration, a development political component is
built which is linked at the same time to EU labor market
aspects. The EU has been striving for already some time to
recruit highly qualified migrants. Educational experience
made in Europe shall serve as a bond for a future return.
Besides, the combination of an ageing society and a shrinking
number of people apt to work - this has drastic effects for
Europe. These facts put pressure upon the pension-, health-
and social system like on economic entities (tax system, eco-
nomic growth) [8: 647]. BWithout migration, the EU will not
be able to meet future labor and skills shortages.^ [8: 648]
Gaps and occupational shortages on European labor mar-
kets might be filled and reduced through short term or circular
migration without committing on the long run - a solution that
is probably easier represented in front of Bthe^ public.
Human rights policy and security policy
The basic idea of an advance in regulating migration is con-
cerned, besides the filling of gaps on European labor markets,
with the desire to control the movements and flows of mi-
grants. So the commitment on the third countries’ part as to
more border control, security and containment of irregular
migrants takes in a crucial position within the partnership
agreements [2: 18–19].
The third link established in the commission’s declaration
is constituted exactly in this context of the improvement of
border administrations. For partner countries this is presented
as an obligation to reduce security risks related to international
migration [5: 5]. A part from risks taken when migrating ir-
regularly a specific focus is set on combating trafficking on
human beings. Here the commission emphasizes everybody’s
right on international protection, which has to be assured for
those who need it. Therefore financial and technical assistance
is granted so that third countries are able to fulfill these obli-
gations in protecting [5: 4–5].
So it is shown that human rights aspects have found their
way into the agreements and are integrated in security policy
by obligations on strengthening borders, border controls or the
improvement of travel documents that shall apparently protect
all the parties concerned [5: 4–5].
Not least does the commission recognize that Buncontrolled^
immigration or transmigration has become a problem for
(potential) partner countries likewise, which is why they might
be welcoming security implications to strengthen their own bor-
ders anyway [9: 175].
EU mobility partnership with Moldova
After the general overview and analysis of the EU mobility
partnerships given above, the mobility partnership with Mol-
dova as one of the partnerships with the longest experience in
this program is being reviewed in this chapter.
In the case of the Moldovan Mobility Partnership, the
following EU member states signed their participation in
May 2008: the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Cy-
prus, the Czech Republic, the French Republic, the Hellenic
Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of
Hungary, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Lithuania,
the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania,
the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic and the
Kingdom of Sweden [4: 1].
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Until now, there is just one report evaluating the Moldovan
mobility partnership available. Finished in April 2012, it eval-
uates the period between the launch of the mobility partner-
ship in June 2008 until the date of expiry in 2011 [6: 2].
Keeping in mind that 4 years have passed since, we have to
assume these results as a certain trend but not as correspond-
ing to the reality of dates. The content of the report is based on
questionnaires sent to all the institutions of the Republic of
Moldova involved in the implementation, to the participating
EUMember States, to international organizations and migrant
organizations. Background information was mainly given
through statistical databases such as Eurostat and the draft
back of the Extended Migration Profile [6: 2].
An important remark is given right at the start, emphasizing
that data and assessment about developments cannot be linked
neatly and solely to the programs and activities of theMobility
Partnership. It cannot be asserted to what extent surrounding
factors were as well influencing the developments [6: 2].
The Mobility Partnerships are part of the EU’s Global Ap-
proach to Migration (GAM) and later complemented by
Mobility (GAMM). The main objectives of the Partnerships
were therefore primarily matched with the three, respectively
later four, pillars of the Global Approach, which are the fol-
lowing: legal migration, migration and development, the fight
against irregular migration and international protection.
With a view to the present evaluation data collection, mon-
itoring is still outlined to be a future goal, although already
mentioned as one objective in 2008. In general a lot of indi-
cators cannot be used clearly because of the lack of data not
just from before 2008 but as well in 2012 [6: 21].
Legal migration
The pillar of BLegal Migration^ comprises probably the
most relevant projects for Moldova as part of the agreement
with the European Union. Already in 2007, 1 year before the
Mobility Partnership was amended, two agreements were
signed between the Republic of Moldova and the European
Union: one facilitating the issues of visa for Moldovan cit-
izens, the other about readmission. These agreements build
Together with the Mobility Partnership these agreements
build the newest framework on legal migration between
Moldova and the European Union. Thus one objective
expressed in the declaration on the Partnership deals with
an improved access to theMember States’ labor markets and
the information about the possibilities of the European labor
market in general. In consequence of the visa facilitation
agreement a visa application center was opened. In order
to inform potential migrants, actions were taken through
websites, such as the publication of country guides, job
fairs, training sessions or study visits. Although it is difficult
to measure the level of information for migrants, a number
of actions have been set in this field [6: 27–30].
However, the prevailing opinion on offers in the sector of
labor migration possibilities, which is given in the Evaluation
Report, including circular and temporary forms, is less posi-
tive and B[…] viewed […] as fairly stagnant.^ [6: 24] From
the EU Member States’ point of view the influence of the
economic crisis, which reached a climax when the Partnership
with Moldova was concluded, is to blame for not having cre-
ated more possibilities to be more active in offering more
possibilities on mobility [6: 24].
Eventually until 2012 small-scale projects were conducted
as pilot projects, from which, in accordance to the Report,
only few individuals have benefitted from the effort made in
the section of circular and temporary migration [6: 25]. Con-
nected to the topic of mobility opportunities for Moldovan
citizens is the intention of improving the BSocial protection
for migrants and the conclusion of social security benefit
transfer agreements^.[6: 29] This work field has made signif-
icant progress in the means of numbers to transfer social se-
curity benefits back and forth between Moldova and EU host
countries, but viable solutions for the more targeted group of
short time migrants are still missing [6: 29]. So the evaluators
conclude that,^it is worrying that the issue of social protection
for migrants, which is very important to MD [Moldovan] au-
thorities, non‐state respondents and the MD migrant organi-
zations, receives relatively little attention by some EU MS
[member state] that host significant populations of MD [Mol-
dovan] migrants.^ [6: 30]
Migration and development
There are certain phenomena related to the action of migra-
tion, which take place either in the outgoing or incoming
country: brain drain and brain waste. Through measures
taken within the Mobility Partnership both of them should
be prevented. The first term means that mostly people with
high potential and specific qualification emigrate to have
better opportunities of working and earning abroad. Clear-
ly, there are negative effects produced on their cities and
countries of origin, if specifically those skilled workers and
highly qualified workforces are missing, who are often
quite important for developments in the home society
(e.g., medicines, scientists, etc.). Brain waste, on the other
hand, describes the phenomenon of Bde-qualification^ of
people conducting jobs below their qualification in a low-
skill sector abroad, not making use of their skills and in the
course of time even losing them. Both the phenomena can
be observed during the migration term, but as well on the
return [6: 37]. Brain drain and brain waste are hard to
quantify since the data recording on education or skills
has not been given much of a priority in the past. However,
as the awareness on the importance of skills and qualifica-
tion is rising, data collecting in the field is on the rise as
well. According to the evaluation report, EU members and
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participants in the partnership do not see the emigration of
knowledge, its effect on Moldova and the structure of its
economy as their responsibility [6: 35–36], so to say as
B[…] beyond the sphere of migration policy.^ [6: 36]
Therefore, corresponding to the evaluators only few activ-
ities were accomplished in preventing brain drain- with
some exceptions such as study visits and returning pro-
grams [6: 35–36]. Whereas in the prevention of brain waste
an initiative on skills validation was started for returning
migrants and concepts were formed on the level of recog-
nition of qualification. The report definitely highlights the
impulse given by the mobility partnership addressing the
questions of validation and description of different types of
learning and the recognition of qualifications [6: 38].
When speaking of the correlation of Migration and Devel-
opment, the importance of remittances is mostly mentioned as
a key impact on countries of the migrants’ origin. Therefore
remittances are as well an objective to be developed within the
partnership. Until 2012 Member States had only one initiative
on transferring money, whereas generally remittances through
official channels are proven to be on the rise [6: 41–42].
Another objective within the pillar of Migration and De-
velopment is the problem of Bchildren and elderly left behind/
without care due to migration^, which rose to a worrying
level. Emphasis was set on measures providing the children
with community activities and psychological support. The ac-
tions assessment concludes negatively as it is stated that a real
improvement can only be achieved by increasing options of
mobility. However, the problem itself gained attention inMol-
dova and Europe [6: 32].
Fight against irregular migration
Objectives and actions in this pillar implicate the moderniza-
tion and professionalization of the Moldovan border manage-
ment [6: 45] and setting new standards in the field of docu-
ment security. Within the next years biometric passports shall
be in use exclusively [6: 47]. Yet, this enormous progress is
facing criticism as well:
However, there may be some tension between increas-
ing document security and fostering mobility. Given the
low average income in MD, it cannot be ruled out that
the increased price of a passport acts as an impediment
to mobility [6: 48].
The strengthening of the readmission agreement, which
was amended in the year 2007 represented by far, the most
lauded content by the respondents of the questionnaire. Pro-
jects supporting the implementation of the agreement were
set up. Nominally it was already clear back then that the
Readmission Agreement had been effective [6: 49–50].
The situation concerning the reduction of irregular
migration and the trafficking in human beings was pictured
likewise. Finally it is stressed that although some partners
were on planning further initiatives, the system in the field
of anti-trafficking is already very complex, which is why a
doubled structure is feared [6: 50–55].
International protection
As far as asylum and international protection are concerned,
projects were planned on improving the Moldovan asylum
system because Moldova does not quite seem experienced in
this area, as it does not appear as a main goal for asylum
seekers, although the number of asylum seekers in Moldova
is on the rise. The actions, which have been taken, were most-
ly on the operational level, like on handling applications. Al-
though progress has taken place, there remains still a lot of
work to be done. The major challenge for the upcoming years
is seen in the integration of migrants [6: 25–30].
Primarily there is a concluding impression given, that
the EU-Moldova cooperation in the framework of the mo-
bility partnership is a very successful one, that interests
were matched very well and that a strengthening in the
fields of mobility and migration has taken place. There is
a big consensus on improvements in the sector of security
and fight against irregular migration (the readmission and
return have been facilitated, the border security has been
strengthened, the asylum system and document security
have been improved), although the evaluators’ note that
this success can be attributed probably more to develop-
ments outside the framework of the Mobility Partnership.
Clearly, there is some more effort to make in enhancing
the possibility of mobility and visa facilitation, as there are
yet very few initiatives to foster circular migration be-
tween the EU and Moldova and those existing are being
conducted in pilot phases on a small scale. The same ap-
plies to the area of Migration and Development in which a
lot of challenges could not be met yet either. This means,
further, that positive effects on migrants and potential mi-
grants themselves were quite scarce and could have been
targeted better [6: 55]. The official 2012 Evaluation Report
concludes as following:
While there is still a predominance of security‐centered
policies aimed at fighting irregular migration, there has
been progress in giving more weight to migration and
development, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, in facil-
itating legal migration. [6: 56]
Another finding of the report underlines that for pursuing
further concepts of temporary migration political and econom-
ic measures are necessary, which are seen far beyond the reach
of migration policies [6: 56].
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Conclusion
The discussion of the variety of measures taken in order
to establish mobility partnerships has shown the far-
reaching effects and consequences of single agreements
and thus the introductory question if Mobility Partner-
ships can be a possible future instrument to the multidi-
mensional challenges Europe is facing cannot be an-
swered in one sentence. It is preferable to submit a num-
ber of sub-answers to cover all the complex aspects this
question brings along. Primarily, there has to be given a
summary why exactly the concept of mobility partnership
could serve as a possible instrument in handling the cur-
rent situation successfully. In the following I would like
to go more into detail as to whether mobility partnerships
are even intended to be part of a possible solution of
Europe’s situation and if, or if not, by whom. These
sub-answers will ultimately lead us to a realistic estima-
tion of the factual situation.
The prior assumption in this text implicated that the EU
uses the migration and development nexus together with the
call for more political coherence as an opportunity to affect
and relate various policy fields like migration, development,
labor market, economy and security with each other by the
establishing of mobility partnerships.
However, it was found that the above-mentioned areas of
policy were connected with each other in a way that finally put
the implications concerned with security aspects into a dom-
inant and central place within the partnership. At the same
time the EU is able to design a selective immigration policy,
on its own condition, adjusted to the European labor markets.
Concessions on actions in the field of development politics are
therefore just to be formed in between the saturated anchor
points of security and labor market policy of the EU actors.
Nonetheless, these development political concessions are to
be valued as strategically crucial components in the making
and negotiating of the mobility partnerships. It became even
apparent that these relations of diverse interests are the key of
cooperation and therefore the programs basis and success of
mobility partnerships.
According to the theoretical approach of the regime the-
ory, as well used in the theory of the border- and migration
regime, a regime, like the present European migration re-
gime, is shaped by various actors and interests and not by
just one linear idea. The same applies to the institution of the
EU, which is not just running by itself but primarily under
the member states’ conditions and among those, probably
under the conditions of the strongest member states. There-
fore, its organization cannot be qualified as being homoge-
nous, but a constitution of related institutions and pre-
eminently the (strongest) member states governments them-
selves, who are in the decision making of the European
asylum- and migration policy.
As regards the question on the intention of mobility part-
nerships in Europe’s future it is quite clear that the European
migration policy, following the argumentation and analysis
described earlier in the text, represents a very restrictive re-
gime. The intention of the instrument of mobility partnerships,
of the strategy of co-operations through relating different in-
terests, can be valued in first place to enlarge its migration
regime/sphere of influence and to externalize Europe’s exter-
nal borders. Through partnerships with Moldova and alike
concrete steps have been taken to integrate these countries into
the European migration regime – future will show to which
grade and intensity. However, this assumption is not contra-
dictory to the fact that these initiatives might have a positive
development political effect, though these effects are to be
valued of a secondary value.
Recapitulating the preceding paragraphs, it is clearly stated
that the prior intention of the mobility partnerships, despite
their multidimensional character, is not solving the consider-
able number of crises Europe is dealing with, but serving
mostly the goal of externalizing its borders as a solution to
upcoming problems. But even if there were different purposes
underlying, could the mobility partnership be a possible future
instrument to encounter the multiple European crises?
Mainly through the report of the Moldovan mobility part-
nership it was outlined that this strategy is no universal rem-
edy. Conditions in partner countries were observed, which
were seen as B[…] beyond the sphere of migration policy
[…]^ [6: 36], but often fundamental for the functioning of
the partnership. Still, according to the Moldovan experiences,
even in the existing framework, success would have been
possible to a greater extent.
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